The Aesthetic Appreciation of Animals in Zoological Parks by Tafalla, Marta
Contemporary Aesthetics
Volume 15 (2017)
1-1-2017
The Aesthetic Appreciation of Animals in
Zoological Parks
Marta Tafalla
Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, marta.tafalla@uab.es
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/
liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Part of the Esthetics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Contemporary Aesthetics by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact mpompeli@risd.edu.
About CA
Journal
Contact CA
Links
Submissions
Search Journal
Enter search terms
Search
Editorial Board
Permission to Reprint
Privacy
Site Map
Publisher
Webmaster
The Aesthetic Appreciation of Animals in Zoological
Parks
  Marta Tafalla 
Abstract
Can we appreciate in a serious and deep way the aesthetic qualities of
wild species in exemplars held captive for exhibition in the artificial
installations of a zoo? To answer this question I invoke theories
concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature propounded by Yuriko
Saito and Allen Carlson. I then argue that zoos impose their story on
animals, thereby preventing us from appreciating the animals on their
own terms. I claim that captivity and its effects on the health, behavior,
and appearance of animals make serious and deep appreciation of the
aesthetic qualities of wild species impossible.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
According to the IUCN, over 23,000 animal and plant species are at risk
of extinction because of human activity. In such a drastic situation,
zoological parks have come to defend a supposed role they play in
animal conservation. They affirm that exemplars kept in captivity act as
ambassadors for wild populations, as a visit to the zoo raises awareness
of the need to protect wildlife in their natural habitat. Zoos claim that the
aesthetic appeal of animals, alongside moral and scientific reasons, will
inspire people to protect threatened species.
The hope that aesthetic appreciation of nature will lead to an ethical
commitment is shared by many, from philosophers to environmentalists.
What is specific to zoos, however, is that they aim to show the aesthetic
qualities of animals through the menageries they hold captive. Several
philosophers and experts on wildlife have criticized the holding of
animals captive in zoos on moral and scientific grounds.[1] I completely
agree with those criticisms but here I want to explore a question that
belongs to the field of aesthetics: Can captive exemplars in the artificial
installations of a zoo reveal to us the beauty, ferocity, elegance, grace
and monstrosity of their species in a serious and deep way?
In searching for an answer to this question, I have come across a range
of ideas. In his book, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature, Malcolm
Budd answers the question in the affirmative:
At a zoo you cannot appreciate an animal in its natural
environment. But it does not follow that your appreciation
must be of a caged animal – an animal as caged. Rather,
you can ignore its surroundings and appreciate the
animal itself (within the severe limits imposed by its
captive state).[2]
An opposing answer comes from Holmes Rolston III, who compares the
experience of seeing wild animals in their natural habitat to exemplars in
a zoo:
[T]he wildlife encounters are entirely off the map. One
needs proper habitat, of course, but habitat is necessary
not sufficient for encounter. You have hoped for six days
of the Yellowstone trip to see a bear, and on the last day,
there one is, only a cub, but a bear nevertheless, feeding
in the Shepherdia bushes.
You never expected the coyote, and he walked by the
car, six feet away, taking you by such surprise that you
couldn’t get the camera from the back seat. … This
explains why zoos do little to preserve wildlife
aesthetically. … a caged bobcat is aesthetically a bobcat
no more.[3]
Although I have found some answers to the question that concerns me
here, unfortunately I have not found any systematic analysis or, even
less, a discussion among several authors. This absence of debate is
symptomatic of the fact that the aesthetic appreciation of animals
receives little attention. Indeed, there are not enough publications on the
topic for us to be properly justified in talking of a specific research field
with its own tradition, a canon of fundamental papers and books, its own
discussions, and everything else that constitutes a specific field of
research in philosophy.
Because there is not yet a proper field of animal aesthetics, in order to
articulate an answer to my question, I take the theoretical framework for
it from environmental aesthetics. First, I consider Yuriko Saito’s idea that
to appreciate a natural object means to appreciate the object as it really
is, not as if it were some other thing. Second, I examine Allen Carlson’s
thesis that in order to aesthetically appreciate a natural element, we
need to have scientific knowledge of it. Although both Saito and Carlson
mostly develop these theories as they relate to environments and only
briefly apply them to animals, I find them to be a sound foundation on
which to build a theory of animal aesthetics.
In the next section of this paper, I use Saito’s and Carlson’s views to
show why, at first glance, it seems that at a zoo we can appreciate the
aesthetic qualities of wild animals. Then, in the third section, I continue
working with Saito’s and Carlson’s theories to argue that, in fact, if we
explore this question in a more rigorous and critical manner, we come to
realize that at a zoo we cannot appreciate the aesthetic qualities of
animals in a serious and deep way. In the fourth section, I synthesize
and discuss both sets of arguments. Connecting with that discussion, in
the fifth section, I defend the necessity of developing a field of research
on the aesthetic appreciation of animals. Finally, I offer some
conclusions.
2. Reasons why it seems that we can appreciate the aesthetic
qualities of wild species through exemplars held captive in zoos
2.1 In her paper, “Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms,” Saito affirms
that in order to appreciate nature aesthetically in an appropriate way, we
must appreciate nature as it is.[4] If we project our own stories onto
nature, we negate the possibility of knowing and appreciating the reality
of nature. I find Saito’s idea insightful because we often do
instrumentalize nature as a vehicle to transmit human meaning. When
animals, natural environments, and other natural elements are depicted
in art or publicity, they are usually presented as metaphors for or
symbols of human emotions and ideas, not as what they themselves
actually are. Saito claims that any natural element has its own biological
role to play, its own story, independent of the symbols we may impose
on it. Because of this, in order to appreciate nature in a deep way, we
should listen to nature’s own story.
I think this should be a fundamental idea in the development of animal
aesthetics. However, I wish to make one small point explicit. Definitely,
seeing a natural element “on its own terms” is more an ideal to orient us
than a goal that we can fully achieve. Complete objectivity is impossible,
as many philosophers have argued, because we humans always
appreciate nature from our own perspective, that is, from within our own
biological nature, our culture, and our subjectivity, and we cannot totally
free ourselves from that. Nonetheless, to assume that we should
conceive of and appreciate a natural element on its own terms is the
appropriate attitude because it implies a basic form of respect and
fosters critical reflection on our own appreciation of nature. The subject
has to listen to the object, to its otherness, and not to subsume it into his
or her own desires and fantasies, not to instrumentalize it as a mere
metaphor for his or her own views, not to reduce it to a mirror for self
reflection. For example, the use of an image of a desert in an
advertisement to sell cars or an image of a hawk to sell perfumes are
clear cases of natural elements not being seen as what they are but
being instrumentalized as symbols of human values.
We can use this idea to answer our question. At first glance, it seems
that modern zoos do present animals as they are, as ambassadors of
their species, and not as fantasies or metaphors. In this sense, zoos
appear to be very different from other modes of exhibiting live animals,
such as the circus, which I mention in the next subsection, and also from
representations of animals, which I consider below in the third
subsection.
It also seems that modern zoos, such as San Diego Zoo in California or
Bioparc in Valencia, Spain, put considerable thought into their design.
The animals are exhibited in enclosures that aim to recreate their natural
habitats, where we can observe them from a variety of angles and
appreciate many different aspects of their bodies and behavior. Well-
designed zoos offer visitors viewing conditions that they would never find
in nature, where most animals hide from us, and it is difficult to get  close
and observe them for long periods. In modern zoos, we can even see
what goes on inside some dens.
In her article, Saito also affirms that we should not reduce nature to its
visual appearance. The Western tradition of picturesque painting and
aesthetic formalism reduces natural elements to their pictorial surface
and formal design. In contrast, Saito strongly defends the idea that we
should appreciate nature with all our senses. If we apply this approach to
our question, we can claim that, in a zoo, people hear the sounds
animals make, smell them, and sometimes even touch them.
Appreciating animals in a zoo is a more bodily, multisensory, and
interactive experience than contemplating them in photographs or films.
2.2 It seems that at a zoo we can appreciate animals better than in any
other type of exhibition of live animals. At a circus, in contrast, we find
animals dressed up and forced to perform in unnatural ways to the
rhythms of music. In fact, what makes animal circus shows amazing is
precisely that the animals accomplish feats that they would never
spontaneously perform in nature and that are so astonishing as to seem
unbelievable. To see wild animals interact successfully with artifacts, like
a bear playing a trumpet or a chimp riding a bicycle; to see animals do
dangerous things for no reason, like lions jumping through a hoop of fire;
to see predator and prey interact in unnatural ways, as in a tiger riding a
horse; and, above all, to see animals perform all these acts because a
person orders them to, is so strange that it only seems possible in a
magical world, and this is the kind of emotion that the circus tries to
provoke in its audience. But the sad reality behind the magic is that this
unnatural behavior is the result of a long and cruel training that provides
us with moral arguments against this kind of practice.
From an aesthetic point of view, the problem is that circus animals are
not presented as themselves. Although the animals are physically
present at the circus, they are not acting as ambassadors of their
species but representing human fantasies about our ability to dominate
and transfigure nature. At a zoo, in contrast, although the animals are
maintained captive in enclosures designed by human beings, it seems
that they are more autonomous in their behavior.
2.3 Zoos also seem to offer a good opportunity to understand animals
because they present real animals, whereas society is full of artistic and
decorative representations of them. Although I think that art has the
capacity to recount animals’ own stories and educate us about them,
especially when it is allied with science, if we look at the history of art,
the vast majority of depictions of animals do not represent them on their
own terms but transfigured into symbols of something else. Nowadays,
we are surrounded by representations of animals in art, publicity, and
artifacts that we encounter in our everyday life. They are omnipresent as
commercial brands, as symbols of human ideas, as fantasy beings
created to entertain children in cartoons, and as mere ornamental
figures, for example, in jewelry.
It is important to consider whether all these representations of animals,
in which they do not appear on their own terms, could have the effect of
making us forget what real animals are like, or could lead us to confuse
real animals with fantasy beings or metaphors. The team of artists
Transnational Temps, formed by Fred Adam, Andy Deck, and Verónica
Perales, deplore the fact that we are surrounded by images of animals
used as commercial brands, sometimes representing companies that
knowingly reduce biodiversity. The paradox the artists denounce is that
our world is full of images of fantasy animals, while at the same time we
ignore real animals condemned to extinction.[5]
In her paper, “Aesthetic Value and Wild Animals,” Emily Brady makes a
point in defense of some uses of animals as symbols: “Some cases of
symbolism based on expressive qualities may therefore be appropriate
and reasonable because they are, in fact, connected to the character
and behavior of such animals.”[6] Even if we accept Brady’s idea, I find it
problematic that the immense majority of our artistic and decorative
representations of animals do not show them as they really are but
transfigure them into something else, sometimes bound to the animal’s
nature and sometimes wildly arbitrary.
Also Thomas Leddy, in his article, “Aesthetization, Artification, and
Aquariums,” makes a defense of the metaphorical appreciation of
animals:
But is seeing something in terms of a category to which it
does not belong necessarily a bad thing?  Although this is
assumed to be true by most scientific cognitivists, the
thesis limits creativity.  When we creatively see
something, whether in art or in science, we see it in terms
of a category to which it does not literally belong.  We can
call such seeing “metaphorical perception.”  To say “Man
is a wolf to man.” is to see man in terms of a category to
which he does not belong.  Nonetheless, when
elaborated, this metaphor presents a possibly valuable
thesis concerning the nature of man.  Many studies in the
philosophy of science, the philosophy of art, and
linguistics show that metaphorical perception plays an
important role in cognition.  Should we exclude such
perception from appreciation of the natural
environment?[7]
The very example Leddy uses shows the problem of this view. Leddy
uses “wolf” as a metaphor applied to human beings. By this metaphorical
sense of “wolf,” he means an irrational beast driven by egoism, violence,
and cruelty. However, when we scientifically observe the behavior of
wolves, we understand that they are intelligent and deeply social and
emotional creatures, capable of empathy and compassion, who develop
a fundamental role in the environments they inhabit. The real nature of
wolves does not resemble this metaphorical view of them as an evil
beast. To see wolves as dark monsters can be creative but to disguise
reality with our fantasies can have real consequences. When people
believe that wolves are evil creatures, they will be less disposed to
respect and defend them. The current hate against wolves, and the fact
that they are massively hunted in many countries, has its roots in this
distorted image of them propagated in our culture that has nothing to do
with their real way of life.
2.4 Let us now consider Carlson’s proposal. In his book, Aesthetics and
the Environment, Carlson, like Saito, defends a cognitive aesthetics, but
the difference is that Carlson has a more strict conception of
knowledge.[8] For Carlson, only natural science provides the framework
we require to be able to appreciate nature as it really is, just as the
history and philosophy of art provide us with the framework required to
appreciate artworks.
Carlson claims that in the Western tradition, two cultural factors have
prevented us from appreciating nature as it really is: a) religion, which
views nature as embodying spiritual symbols; and b) pictorial
representation and aesthetic formalism, which reduce nature to images.
In contrast, Carlson defends a secular and scientific foundation for the
aesthetic appreciation of nature. It is also important to highlight the fact
that in his defense of scientific knowledge, Carlson is not referring to
vivisection in a laboratory but is invoking naturalists who familiarize
themselves with environments and their inhabitants, listening to nature’s
own stories. Carlson’s argument evokes the American tradition of nature
writing, as exemplified by Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold.
Carlson’s idea that only natural science provides us with the framework
necessary to appreciate nature as it is has received several criticisms.
Different authors have claimed that science is not a sure way to
objectivity, and that, in spite of its quantitative approach and strict
methodology, science remains as cultural in its essence as art is.[9] As
an example of the failure of science to offer an objective view, we should
remember that for centuries scientists defended a mechanical view of
animals and nature.
I do not consider these criticisms as sufficient to refute Carlson’s theory
but they should be taken seriously. I think that one sound response
could be to maintain a critical and prudent attitude to the particular
scientific knowledge we are using, and not to forget the transient nature
of scientific theories. However, this attitude is already a proper part of
science, as scientific progress consists of continuously rethinking and
correcting previous ideas. Also, I  consider that defending science as the
proper framework from which to appreciate nature aesthetically should
not exclude art. It excludes certain kinds of art but not all art. I consider
that good artistic representations of nature that are scientifically
informed, that bring together art and science, can help us to appreciate
nature aesthetically.[10] In the same way, I think that traditional
knowledge based on accurate observations of nature can also help us to
get to know and appreciate nature aesthetically, an idea that I think is
similar to the one Yuriko Saito and Thomas Heyd defend.[11]
If we apply Carlson’s theory to our problem, we find that modern zoos
seem to offer a scientific framework within which to appreciate animals.
The distribution of animals within the zoo corresponds to a scientific
classification, and every enclosure includes information concerning the
name of the species and some scientific background, as in a natural
history museum. In the particular case of aquariums, Nola Semczyszyn
even claims in her paper, “Public Aquariums and Marine Aesthetics,”
that “Aquarium displays should be considered scientific representations
of marine environments.”[12]
So, at first glance, it certainly seems that at zoos we can appreciate the
aesthetic qualities of wild species. However, if we continue to analyze
this issue in a more rigorous and critical manner, we will see that in fact
we cannot appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild animals in a serious
and deep way in a zoo.
3. Reasons why we cannot appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild
species in a serious and deep way through exemplars held captive
in zoos
3.1 Displaying animals in zoos entails an object model of appreciation,
which Carlson has denounced as inappropriate, while defending the
natural environmental model:
Natural objects possess what might be called organic
unity with their environments of creation: such objects are
a part of, and have developed out of, the elements of
their environments by means of the forces at work within
those environments. Thus their environments of creation
are aesthetically relevant to natural objects.[13]
The aesthetic qualities of animals are relational. It is necessary to
perceive the animal in her natural environment in order to comprehend
her. The external appearance of an animal, her form, color, and kind of
fur or feathers she has, the sounds she produces, and how she moves,
all evolved over thousands of years in particular environments. The
color of a lion is the color of the African savanna. The color of a polar
bear is the color of frozen seas. The fur of arctic foxes is a response to
the freezing weather. The shape of the beak of each species of bird
depends on the food she eats. The way an ibex moves has to do with
her ability to climb rocks. An animal is not an object that you can just
move from one setting to another, like a sculpture. When you remove an
animal from her natural environment, you no longer have a complete
animal, only a fragment.
3.2 Because of processes of globalization and homogenization, all
around the world most zoos exhibit the same delocalized animals, “star
species,” such as large mammals. This phenomenon is similar to the
omnipresence of certain international commercial brands in every big
city and airport, and it has an important consequence. The presence of
the same species in zoos all around the world instills in visitors the belief
that they know these animals, in the same way a shopper feels familiar
with the products of a commercial brand found in many different cities
and countries. Because of this, it is more difficult for visitors to
understand that when they see an orangutan in a zoo enclosure, they
are only seeing a delocalized fragment and not a complete animal. In
fact, the more they see the orangutan in different countries, the less
likely they are to remember which environment the species belongs to.
The ubiquity of the orangutan in zoos in every continent generates the
illusion that she does not belong to any specific environment.  
At the same time, this phenomenon exacerbates the tendency for many
people to neglect the local fauna of their own environments because
they find it too ordinary, in contrast with the spectacularity and glamour
of star species advertised by zoos.[14]
3.3 Saito claims that in order to aesthetically appreciate animals of a
particular species, we should appreciate the distinctive characteristics of
that species: the cheetah-like-ness, the eagle-like-ness, and so forth.[15]
But animals display their distinctive characteristics through their natural
behavior. We appreciate the agility of a cheetah when she runs, and the
elegance of an eagle when she flies. The limited and artificial space of
zoos makes it impossible for animals to behave naturally.
Moreover, animals have to develop artificial behavior in order to adapt to
the designed spaces they are confined to. Their enclosures are ruled by
arbitrary human norms, and because animals are often moved from one
zoo to another, they may have to readapt to new arbitrary rules. When
zoos develop programs of captive breeding, they are creating exemplars
that are only able to survive in the artificial world of a zoo, governed by
human whim.
Consider, for example, that zoos deny animals the possibility of
searching for their food. In zoos, humans decide when and how often the
animals eat, and also what kind of food they receive. Instead of actively
searching for food, the animals have to passively wait for it. Very often,
zoos give animals their food in front of visitors, although for a wild animal
it is unnatural to eat in front of people who applaud and cheer. We
should also take into account that most zoos prevent predation, and
sometimes substitute it with very artificial behavior. For example, bears,
tigers, and lions are given food hidden inside toys they have to open. In
this particular case, zoos change behavior expressing ferocity, velocity,
and intelligence that shows the wild animal as the dangerous creature
she is for interaction with a toy that shows the animal to be passive,
inoffensive, and childlike.
In the case of dolphins and orcas that are trained to perform, they have
to learn to obey human orders, to perform choreographed sequences,
and to learn that they receive their food when they do as their human
trainers command. Although zoos call this enrichment, the result is that
the animals have to adapt to the arbitrary rules that humans impose on
them. In this sense, although what zoos do to animals is apparently
different from what circuses do to them, actually it is very similar. Zoos
modify animals behavior to adapt it to the very fact that they are
exhibited to an audience. 
Furthermore, captivity affects health, appearance, and attitude. Captive
animals often perform compulsive movements, behave repetitively, and
may also have wounds and bruises. Most of them look sad, frustrated,
stressed, depressed, or angry. Their native aesthetic qualities are
seriously impoverished.
3.4 There are some specific aesthetic qualities of wild species that it is
almost impossible to appreciate at a zoo. Many wild animals, such as big
cats or crocodiles, are dangerous creatures; they are strong, fierce, fast,
imposing, and aggressive. The appreciation of these animals has more
to do with the sublime than with beauty itself. When we have the
opportunity to encounter them in their natural environments, they
awaken our admiration at the same time as our fear. We know that a
bear or a mountain lion could kill us, and the sensation of danger that we
feel belongs to the aesthetic experience. On seeing a wild crocodile, just
as on witnessing the power of a great storm, we experience ourselves
as finite and humble creatures before the forces of nature, and this can
be a deep and meaningful aesthetic experience. However, when we go
to admire these animals at a zoo, we encounter subdued animals caged
in small spaces and passively waiting for their food; all their force and
power has disappeared. Then we go to the gift shop and find bears
portrayed as teddy bears, crocodiles used as a basis for funny designs
on children’s pajamas, or tigers adopted as motives for jewelry. In this
way, zoos neutralize the force and power of wild species and prevent us
from appreciating these animals as they really are. As Thomas Leddy
affirms about the souvenirs in aquariums shops: “Many of these artifacts
are clearly kitsch; they play on sentimentality and discourage serious
reflection. … It is crass when people are encouraged to reduce their
experience of a seal to a furry purchasable item.”[16]
The aesthetics of modern zoos is constituted from a mixture of a natural
history museum, an amusement park, and a mall to go window shopping
in, and they are specially designed to entertain children. Many zoos
combine animal enclosures with play facilities for children that are
designed using representations of animals. London Zoo has a carousel
of toy animals; Barcelona Zoo even has real ponies to ride. It is quite
remarkable that in 2013, the Barcelona City Council offered a combined
entrance ticket for both its zoo and an amusement park called Tibidabo;
the publicity for the offer depicted a real zebra in front of a toy horse. The
audience was apparently invited to identify a real animal with a toy
whose function was to amuse children.[17]
Zoo gift shops reinforce the perception of animals as toys. The teddy
bears they sell represent animals but have softer textures, brighter
colors, and other changes that make them more attractive to children.
Similarly, children’s books are full of animals represented as fancy
imaginative creatures; some real features are mixed with fantasy, and it
can become difficult to teach the difference between fantasy and reality.
In addition, this infantilizing of animals instills the idea that animals
belong to a childish fantasy world that should be abandoned when one
becomes an adult.
Children are the most important public at zoos; they visit zoos both with
their families and with their schools. In contrast, it is highly infrequent to
encounter adults visiting zoos with no children. When I visited several
zoos in different countries to gather material for this paper, I went alone
and spent time in front of every enclosure taking notes. That made me a
very unusual kind of visitor, and was sufficient to awaken the attention
and suspicions of some caretakers who tried to find out just who I was
and what I was doing.
3.5 When we aim to appreciate nature aesthetically, we can enjoy a
huge range of aesthetic experiences of plants, geological elements,
meteorological events, environments, and so on, but only through
animals is nature able to look back at us. Animals are the only natural
elements that can perceive us, that can look at us when we look at them,
that can react to us with different emotions and behavior, and that, in
some cases, can even communicate with us. This is because animals,
like us, are not objects but subjects. To look into the eyes of an animal
that looks back at you is one of the most awesome aesthetic
experiences that we can enjoy in nature. In the words of Holmes Rolston
III:
The aesthetic experience differs because of the
reciprocity. There is a ‘window’ into which we can look
and from which someone looks out. They have, so to
speak, points of view. There is fire in those eyes.…. (…)
There is kinship, as there may not be with aesthetic
contemplation of flowers or scenery. But there is never
identity, and humans can but imagine what it must be like
to be a duck, a chipmunk, an elk, a plover. There is alien
subjectivity which stands over against human subjectivity,
a mysterious other with differences both of degree and
kind.[18]
Every animal is not only an ambassador for her species but is an
individual with a subjective life and a personal story. They are subjects
who feel pain and pleasure, who possess cognitive, emotional, and
communicative capacities, and who possess memory and form social
links.[19] As a consequence, to be exhibited in a zoo causes them
suffering. For example, chimpanzees in a zoo become stressed,
because there are so many people around the cage all day long looking
at them, pointing at them, shouting at them, banging on the glass, taking
photos, throwing objects, and making noise.[20]
If we want to appreciate animals on their own terms, then viewing them
as subjects should be the central factor. But zoos do not display animals
as subjects. If they did, we would understand that the animals are in the
zoo against their own desire for freedom, and that they are suffering
physically and psychologically because of their captivity. Zoos only
attempt to show animals as ambassadors of their species, and they
present them in an objectified way. For example, on the information
panels provided in the enclosures, zoos usually offer general information
about the species but it is extremely rare for them to offer particular
information about the individuals exhibited, such as origin, history,
personality, health, family, and so on. At most, they will offer a name and
some nice anecdotes aimed at children. In contrast, in sanctuaries and
rescue centers, such as the Fundación Mona, in Spain, that rescues
chimpanzees and macaques who were used in the circus and on TV
shows and were severely abused, the focus is on the stories of the
rescued animals,  their personalities, and the effects that captivity and
mistreatment have had on their physical and psychological health. To
present animals as individuals is necessary in order to understand what
animals are, to learn to respect them, and also to appreciate them
aesthetically, because every individual is unique.
4. Discussion
I will begin the discussion with a brief summary of the previous sections.
In the second section, I presented some arguments in defense of the
idea that we can appreciate the aesthetic qualities of wild species
through captive exemplars held in zoos. That is, that zoos are
appropriate places to go if we want to admire the aesthetic qualities of
wild animals. Then, in the third section, I provided several arguments
against that thesis. Now, I wish to bring both sets of arguments together
and play them off against each other.
All the arguments in favor of zoos share a common idea: that zoos offer
us an objective, neutral, and unbiased frame that allows us to appreciate
animals as they are. According to these arguments, zoo enclosures are
windows into nature; zoos frame a piece of nature for us, and give us
enhanced conditions of visibility that we could not find in the wild. In
contrast, arguments against zoos share an opposing idea, that beneath
the appearance of objectivity zoos are actually presenting us with an
incomplete, superficial, and distorted view of animals. In order to be
exhibited in the zoo enclosure, the animals have been extracted from
the environments where they belong and without which they lose part of
their identity. In these enclosures, the animals cannot behave naturally
and, at the same time, are forced to perform artificially. Because of all
this, captivity affects the physical and psychological health of animals.
Furthermore, zoos are presenting animals as ornamental objects to
contemplate, as nice appearances to watch and photograph, but not as
subjects who also look at us and who suffer from stress when they see
so many people looking at them every day. The way in which zoos
provide information on animals is deeply biased in order to foster their
infantilization. They are presented as fantasy creatures and toys, not as
the wild animals they are.
When we bring the two arguments together, the following idea comes to
the fore. What makes visitors believe that they are appreciating the
aesthetic qualities of wild species in zoos is the mere fact that they are
perceiving the real animals that are in front of them in the enclosures. In
this situation, it is easy to believe that zoos are windows into nature. It is
more difficult to understand that zoos use real animals to prevent visitors
from viewing animals on their own terms. What the arguments against
zoos are telling us is that zoos are not windows into nature but
Procrustean beds. In order to comprehend this, we need to compare the
aesthetic appreciation of animals in the wild and animals in zoos. At the
zoo, we encounter the body of the animal in the cage but we are missing
the conditions in which that body can flourish. We are missing the
environment which the animal belongs in and where she can develop
her way of life. Furthermore, we are missing a correct framework that
would allow us to understand all this.
Zoos reduce animals to bodies, to a mere physical presence, to
ornamental objects that can be exhibited and contemplated, to pleasant
appearances we like to watch, but the true identity of an animal is much
more than her body. They are subjects with different capacities, who
develop and express their identity in complex behavior and through
multiple relations with their environment, and with all the other
individuals of the same and different species who inhabit it. This is the
core of the problem. At a zoo, we cannot appreciate in a serious and
deep way the aesthetic qualities of wild species because zoos are not
showing us wild animals on their own terms. 
Zoos present the cage as an objective and unbiased frame within which
to view animals, but a cage encloses the animal far away from her
environment and her freedom. The cage is not an unbiased frame but a
Procrustean bed, an artifact that radically changes the life of the animal
held in it. The cage contains the body of the animal but has, in fact,
mutilated her identity. Unfortunately, if people have visited zoos since
childhood and have always seen animals this way, they are unlikely to
be conscious of what they are missing. 
In addition, we have to emphasize the fact that zoos aestheticize
captivity and normalize the image of wild animals behind bars in artificial
enclosures and displayed for our enjoyment. In a zoo, the audience
learns to accept the captivity of animals as a spectacle to watch, and this
reinforces the view of animals as our property, as commodities for us to
use as we wish.[21] Although zoos claim that the function of holding
animals captive is to convince us to protect wild animals in their natural
habitats, it is difficult to see how the image of a caged animal can teach
us the value of freedom. This contradictory message that a cage can
help to protect freedom actually becomes a justification for holding the
animal in the cage. When children visit zoos with their schools and
families, they learn that cages are the places where animals live.
The negative effects of zoos are not limited to old-fashioned ones with
animals confined in small and simple cages without enrichment.
Although modern zoos offer larger and enriched enclosures, the animals
are still captive in artificial spaces ruled by arbitrary human norms. The
aim of zoos is to exhibit the animals, and because of this, even the most
modern zoos treat animals as spectacles to watch, expose them many
hours every day to the noise and annoyances that people produce, and
foster an objectified, distorted, and infantilized view of them.
5. The need for animal aesthetics
After that brief discussion, I would like to consider the specific question
regarding the aesthetic appreciation of animals in zoos from a broader
perspective. As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there is not
yet sufficient literature on animal aesthetics for it to be considered as a
research field in its own right. What are the reasons for this?
In his paper, “The Aesthetic Value of Animals,” Glenn Parsons sets out
to identify and analyze the reasons philosophers could have for not
embarking on the study of animal aesthetics.[22] One of the reasons he
examines is that the aesthetic appreciation of beings that deserve moral
respect, such as humans and other animals, quickly becomes morally
and politically problematic. According to Parsons, the problem is that the
aesthetic appreciation of animals or humans seems to focus only on
their external appearance; that is, it seems to reduce them to a
superficial perspective. As a consequence, it would seem that to defend
the aesthetic appreciation of animals could go against their defense as
subjects who deserve moral respect. The “immorality objection” for
engaging in animal aesthetics, as Parsons calls this, means that we
should study animals as part of ethics, not within aesthetics.
I agree with Parsons that this may be one of the reasons for the neglect
of animal aesthetics, and I also sympathize with his way of defending
animal aesthetics against this objection. Parsons claims that an
appropriate animal aesthetics cannot be attacked via the “immorality
objection” because it does not reduce animals to their mere appearance
and does not relate with them in a shallow way. Quite the contrary. An
appropriate animal aesthetics takes into account the nature of animals in
a significant way. His idea is that to aesthetically appreciate animals
means to appreciate their functional beauty,  to appreciate how they are
“looking fit for function.” For example, the body of a cheetah is beautiful
because it is functional, because it is constituted in such a way that
allows the animal to run at high speed, which is one of the principal
characteristics of the behavior of a cheetah. By appreciating the
functional beauty of animals, by appreciating how animals are indeed
“looking fit for function,” we appreciate their aesthetic value as it is
intrinsically related to their nature.
I also value a partially similar approach by Ned Hettinger, in his paper,
“Animal Beauty, Ethics, and Environmental Preservation,” to the defense
of animal aesthetics when faced with a set of arguments that run along
the same lines as the “immorality objection.” Although I do not agree
with some of his ideas, I do agree with his claim that the aesthetic
appreciation of animals is more rich and complex than a trivial
appreciation of the mere attractiveness of a body.[23]
What I find is most important to defend here, however, as an answer to
this kind of objection, is that to develop animal aesthetics could be
enormously helpful to animal ethics. My point is that several forms of
exploitation and mistreatment of animals imply a shallow and distorted
aesthetic appreciation of them, and the claim I wish to make is that a
critical theory of animal aesthetics would allow us to analyze and
denounce such cases. The problem posed by the appreciation of
animals at zoos is just such an example. The case of circus animal
shows would be another, and I can imagine several more: bullfighting,
hunting, bird song competitions, horse and dog racing, and so on. We
could analyze how, in these cases, animals are reduced to their external
appearance and treated as mere ornamental objects, as spectacles to
watch, and we could contrast this with an opposing serious and deep
aesthetic appreciation of those animals.
In order to appreciate animals in an appropriate way, as Yuriko Saito
affirms, we should appreciate them on their own terms, as what they
are. We can respectfully visit their environments and view animals there
as subjects who are living their lives. We do not need to travel far away
to see “star species,” we can go to the nearest forest or beach and take
delight in the local fauna. If we feed our aesthetic appreciation with the
knowledge provided by natural science, as Allen Carlson recommends
we do, and we contemplate animals with some background knowledge
of their physiology, evolutionary story, behavior, capacities, and so on,
then we can enjoy a progressively deeper appreciation. In the behavioral
patterns of every species, we will appreciate the expression of a specific
intelligence, and of different ways to resolve problems, to express
emotions, and to communicate with others. And no matter how much
knowledge we possess concerning them, animals will always surprise
us. Surprise is the gift that free animals offer us and that zoos take away.
Precisely because zoos can assure us that we are going to see the
animals, that the animals are waiting in their cages to be seen, the
magic of surprise, which is the magic of freedom, disappears. 
With time and patience, we learn to recognize the songs of different bird
species, and we appreciate in this a plurality of aesthetic qualities; we
find some birdsong harmonious, some joyful, and another melancholic.
We see that every bird flies in a particular manner, and we judge some
flights to be graceful, others elegant, and others mysterious. We learn to
appreciate the subtleties of the facial expressions of mammals, who can
look beautiful to us but also terrifying. We enjoy the way animals hide in
and mimic the vegetation, so that sometimes, despite being so very
near, they are almost impossible to perceive. We follow stories, the
stories of particular individuals we recognize, whose behavior we
observe over years, and we happily follow stories of learning, when
young birds learn to fly, for example. But we also follow dramas, such as
when an individual is expelled from a group and has to set out alone.
And, unfortunately, we follow tragedies, as when one animal is killed by
another and mourned by her fellows. Seeing behavior such as
predation, we find that aesthetic appreciation of animals not only gives
us pleasure but it can also cause us displeasure and provoke in us
suffering, sadness, and melancholy.
In her article, “Ugliness and Nature,” Emily Brady reflects on the
aesthetic appreciation of predation and defends the notion that some
animal species, some animal behavior, some individual animals affected
by disease, and the corpses of dead animals can be judged as ugly. She
also reflects on other aesthetic qualities that provoke different kinds of
displeasure in us, and affirms that the aesthetic appreciation of these
qualities plays its own role in our relation with animals and nature.[24]
In summary, the aesthetic appreciation of animals is not about
ornamental objects or mere bodies and appearances, it is the
appreciation of subjects living their lives. As a consequence, the
appreciation of animals leads us to appreciate the networks of life to
which they belong and the environments they inhabit. However, we
should face the problem of the impact that may be caused by too many
people visiting some environments. One solution could be to combine
the visits with other strategies, like the installation of webcams in the
environments that allow us to watch wild animals without disturbing them
and can be used for scientific and educational purposes, be commented
on in social networks, and so on.
The diversity of animal species is so huge that we still do not even know
how many currently inhabit this planet. When we concentrate on
appreciating dragonflies, for example, we find that there are currently
more than 3,000 species. By comparing different dragonflies, we can
admire multiple combinations of forms and colors and also variations in
behavior. In this way, aesthetic appreciation of animals teaches us to
take delight in difference and plurality, that is, biodiversity. Biologists tell
us that biodiversity is the fundamental measure of the health of an
environment. If there is a wide variety of species, and also a wide
genetic variety within every species, then it is a healthy environment. If
there is a low level of biodiversity, the environment is stressed and can
be more easily affected by disease. In a similar way, we can state that
biodiversity is a measure of the aesthetic richness of an environment.
That we aesthetically appreciate animals does not mean that we should
protect the species we judge to be beautiful and eliminate those we
judge to be ugly. Precisely what aesthetic appreciation of animals
teaches us is that beautiful and ugly are only two of the great diversity of
aesthetic qualities we value in different species, and also in the different
behavior exhibited by the same species, which can be judged as
elegant, harmonious, joyful, playful, graceful, fierce, majestic, imposing,
delicate, fragile, tender, colorful, monstrous, comic, mysterious,
enigmatic, interesting, melancholic, disgusting, terrifying, sublime, and
so on. Some of these qualities prompt different kinds of pleasure in us,
like joy, serenity, vitality, amusement, surprise, and so on, and others
provoke different kinds of displeasure in us, for example, sadness, fear,
or disgust. This plurality of aesthetic qualities is the appropriate way to
admire biodiversity, which is the very core of nature. It is appropriate to
find aesthetic value in every species, and because each one is unique
and plays her own role in her environment and has a particular way of
life, in every species we can admire a different combination of aesthetic
qualities.
To classify species as beautiful or ugly would be to reduce the immense
diversity of nature to a simplistic binary system. To protect the animals
we judge to be beautiful and eliminate those we find ugly would be to
subject the plurality of nature to the monopoly of a very particular taste
imposed by one species. An environment will always be aesthetically
richer if it has a high level of biodiversity, and it will be aesthetically
poorer if it is dominated by one species that imposes her particular
criteria on it. The cause of the present aesthetic impoverishment of
nature is the extinction of species and destruction of habitats brought
about by humans. I should add, nonetheless, that people do not only
damage species they find ugly, they also damage the ones they find
aesthetically attractive because they hunt them to gain a trophy or to
display them in their collections, and here we once again run into to the
problem with zoos.
Furthermore, I think that a serious and deep aesthetic appreciation of
animals can instill moral respect in us. That aesthetics could lead to
ethics is an old hope in philosophy that has been defended in several
ways and criticized in many others. It is a tricky topic that, no doubt, we
will continue to discuss forever. We can look, however, to what happens
in environmental philosophy. In the field of environmental aesthetics, we
find a common expectation shared by many authors that a serious and
deep aesthetic appreciation of the environment can lead to an ethical
commitment. Every environmental philosopher defends this idea in his
or her particular manner, and some may be more optimistic than others.
But there is a shared intuition that aesthetics and ethics can reinforce
each other and that they should work together to protect nature.[25] I
have the same expectation and the same hope of animal aesthetics
working together with animal ethics.
Notwithstanding, some philosophers defend the need for animal
aesthetics but not this strong connection with ethics. This is the case, I
think, with Stephen Davies. In his book, The Artful Species, Davies
offers an interesting contribution to animal aesthetics, studying the
evolutionary roots of our appreciation of animals. He describes many
different ways of appreciating animals aesthetically. But when it comes
to the relation with ethics, Davies denies any direct connection between
a superficial appreciation of animals and morally wrong behavior towards
them, and claims that a superficial appreciation of animals can also be
valuable. Discussing the idea defended by Carlson and Parsons that we
should appreciate animals for what they are, Davies affirms:
I share the thought that we can take pleasure in an
animal’s suitedness to its environment and way of life, but
I think alternative approaches to animal beauty are not
inappropriate or immoral in the way that is suggested. For
instance, we might consider a bird as if it is a mobile
sculpture. …so long as it does not lead to immoral
behavior, there need be nothing untoward in pursuing
and enjoying an aesthetic response that is shallow. …
There is no doubt that animals can be and often are
morally wronged by humans. But I doubt that there’s a
direct connection between that fact and the adoption of
an aesthetic attitude to an animal’s appearance that is
partial or even shallow.[26]
I believe that such a connection does exist. To see a bird as a mobile
sculpture, as in the example Davies proposes, means seeing the bird as
an ornamental object and not as a subject. Objectifying a subject in this
fashion is a way to prepare the terrain for her exploitation. The problem
is not an isolated case but the fact that in our society the appreciation of
animals as ornamental objects is systematic, and this kind of
appreciation fosters an attitude that makes it easy to exploit and mistreat
animals.
Viewing an animal as what she is, viewing an animal as a subject
developing her own way of life, entails a basic form of respect, and it is
this basic form of respect that can lead to an ethical commitment. To
appreciate an animal as what she is requires an effort on our part to
give primacy to the animal over our desires and interests; it requires an
attitude of humility. It means listening to the animal instead of imposing
our own voice. In contrast, when we have a distorted and superficial view
of animals, we give primacy to our own desires and interests over those
of the animal. We want the animal to look like and to mean what we want
it to, and this attitude is a will for dominance over the animal. We
conceive the animal as a mere instrument for our own ends, as an
aesthetic instrument. We want to dissociate the appearance of the
animal from her identity, and use her appearance to dress our own
ideas.
How can the appreciation of a bird as if she were a mobile sculpture lead
us to behave in a morally wrong way towards that animal? I think it could
lead to killing the bird, dissecting her, and exhibiting her as a sculpture in
a literal sense. Or it could lead to putting the bird in a cage for the rest of
her life, as many people do. If we conceive and appreciate the animal as
an object, it is easier for us to treat her as an object. In contrast, if we
appreciate the bird as a subject who has her own interests, desires, and
emotions, and her own life to live, then it is easier for us to develop an
attitude of respect for her life and her freedom, easier that we step back
and renounce dominance over her, stop reducing her to an instrument
for our own ends.
To impose our fantasies on an animal is a form of aesthetic domination,
and it has a strong connection with real domination and real abuse.
There is a connection between the aesthetic appreciation of animals as
toys and the exploitation of animals in circus shows, where they are
forced to perform as if they were toys. There is a connection between
the aesthetic appreciation of a bull as a dark monster that symbolizes
night and death, and cruelly killing him in a bullfight. In several cases of
exploitation and mistreatment of animals, we are forcing them to
incarnate our fantasies, metaphors, and symbols. We impose our stories
on animals with such conviction and intensity, we impose our stories on
so many animals and so often and in such a systematic way, that we
finally forget the identity of the animals and believe that our fantasies are
their true identities. This is exactly what I think happens in zoos.
6. Conclusion
For all these reasons, I believe that at a zoo we cannot appreciate the
aesthetic qualities of wild species in a serious and deep way.
Furthermore, I argue that the fact that zoological parks cannot reveal the
aesthetic qualities of animals to us in a serious and deep way sharply
brings into question the effectiveness of zoos at raising awareness
concerning endangered species. I think that this criticism should be
added to the moral and scientific criticism that philosophers and experts
on wildlife level against zoos.
Of course, different arguments could be raised against my claims, and
further discussion will be necessary. However, the only way to discuss
all this in detail is to give animal aesthetics the attention it deserves.
Environmental aesthetics is a rich field that enters into fertile dialogue
and collaboration with environmental ethics. Animal aesthetics could
play a similar role in relation to animal ethics. In fact, I think that the four
disciplines could work side by side towards a deeper understanding of
our relation with animals and nature, and help us to find a way to a
better life together.
I think, further, that animal aesthetics should enter into dialogue with
non-philosophical disciplines that also focus on our relation with animals
and take into account aesthetic perspectives. Ecocriticism, critical animal
studies, and visual studies applied to animals are clear cases in point. In
fact, it is interesting to see how, in these fields, reflection on animals is
rapidly growing.[27] Animals are becoming the center of interest of many
disciplines, and it would be a regrettable loss if philosophers were not to
develop animal aesthetics.
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